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Mark Charles Fissel, English
Warfare 1511-1642 (New York:
Routledge, 2001), $26.95 US paper,
382 pages, ISBN 0-415-21482-3.
This is a highly ambitious book,both in terms of the ground cov-
ered and in the nature of the ques-
tions posed. It begins with Henry
VIII’s continental expedition of 1511
(although the reasons for the choice
of this date are not clearly spelled
out) and ends in 1642, with the
outbreak of the Civil War in Eng-
land;  the focus is on land warfare.
The author asks broad questions.
Did an “English art of war” exist
during this period? How expert
were Englishmen in the practice of
arms?   Were they, as frequently
alleged, inferior to their continen-
tal counterparts in this era of the
early modern military revolution?
In pursuing the answers to these
questions, the author uses a dual
approach. There are several narra-
tive chapters, concentrating on spe-
cific theatres and periods (for ex-
ample, “The Early Tudor Art of War
on the Continent and Elizabethan
War in the Netherlands, 1572-92").
There are also several thematic
chapters on topics such as “Ord-
nance and Logistics, 1511-1642"
and “The Defence of the Shire: Lieu-
tenancy.” In the final chapter Fissel
concludes that an “English art of
war” certainly existed and that the
peculiarities of the English strate-
gic predicament in this period ne-
cessitated the achievement of mili-
tary expertise in virtually all forms
of warfare. The tragedy of 1642, he
asserts, was that whereas English
strategy since the mid-1500s had
concentrated on preventing foreign
invasions of the realm, in the end,
England assimilated the military
revolution fully only through Civil
War.
The book is based on an im-
pressive depth of research, as the
copious endnotes and the lengthy
list of abbreviations demonstrate.
The bibliographical essay, also, is
valuable to any student of military
history. Overall, however, the book
fails to satisfy. One of the problems
is undoubtedly organisational. The
chapter divisions, and the subdivi-
sion of chapters into what are fre-
quently self-contained sections
which bear little apparent relation
to what precedes or follows, are not
happy. For example, although there
is a separate chapter on Ordnance
and Logistics covering the whole
period, there are may other discus-
sions of these topics elsewhere,
some of them over several  pages.
Furthermore, in a chapter on Eliza-
bethan and Jacobean allied opera-
tions on the continent, the author
chooses to include a section enti-
tled “The English School of War”
which consists of a dozen or so bio-
graphical sketches of the Queen’s
soldiers; these may be interesting
but they are of no direct relevance
to the chapter. There is also a cer-
tain amount of chronological drift
as the author breaks free from the
self-imposed strait-jacket of his
chapter headings. The very detailed
factual narratives which form a
large part of the book frequently
begin and end without an adequate
context being given. Few under-
graduate students (the author’s in-
tended readers, together with “all
students of English history”) could
cope with the welter of characters
introduced in these sections, par-
ticularly in the Irish portions,
where there are also problems with
terms such as “the old English” and
“gallowglass,” which surely require
prompt and simple explanation.
There are numerous errors in
expression and spelling which more
careful editing might have helped
to eradicate: see, for example, page
65, where proffer should be sub-
stituted for prefer; page 151, where
rein should replace reign; and
page133 where suppression is mis-
spelled. Factual errors abound.
Edward IV (21) was never King of
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Scotland. On page 22, James IV
dies at Flodden (1514) but myste-
riously re-appears in 1523 (25),
fighting back against the English.
On page 53 Northumberland
should be identified as Duke, not
Earl, and he did not hold the title
of Protector. Although maps are
provided in this volume, the battle
sites are crammed in; this is quan-
tity at the expense of clarity. Quota-
tions from original documents are
well-chosen and illuminating, but
many require ruthless pruning.
A major problem also is the au-
thor’s attribution of specific char-
acteristics to various national
groups. In what sense were tactics
of harassment, rapid deployment,
surprise, and sporadic attack “dis-
tinctly Irish” (228)? Why is candour
particularly Welsh (12)? As for the
English, the attitude towards them
is highly uncritical. Again and again
they are praised for their eclecti-
cism, flexibility, inventiveness,
adaptability, tactical ingenuity, and
bold command (see, for example,
1, 134, 282). They may be ill-pre-
pared, but somehow they muddle
through. This (English) reviewer
was reminded of  Flanders and
Swann’s famous satirical Song of
Patriotic Prejudice, with its refer-
ence to foreigners’ lack of sports-
manship: “They argue with umpires,
they cheer when they’ve won, And
they practise beforehand which ru-
ins the fun.” Fissel himself (1) sug-
gests that war was for the English
essentially a sporting event.
His spin on English actions is
always positive; thus the persistence
of the longbow is not evidence of
English backwardness but of eclec-
ticism (288), while the decision of
Sir Roger Williams (a soldier of
fortune if ever there was one) to take
service with the Spaniards for a
while is somewhat fancifully attrib-
uted to his need to assimilate the
Spanish art of war in order to de-
feat them later (141).
  A good book could have been writ-
ten on the basis of the author’s re-
search;  unfortunately, this is not
it.
BCM
* * * * *
William H. Whyte, A Time of War:
Remembering Guadalcanal, A
Battle Without Maps (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2000),
$25.00 US paper, 145 pages, ISBN
0-8232-2008-7.
Whyte is best known as the au-thor of The Organization
Man, a 1956 best-seller that exam-
ined American society, but before
achieving notoriety he was an of-
ficer with the US Marine Corps on
Guadalcanal. As an intelligence ex-
pert who was responsible for ex-
amining captured Japanese docu-
ments, he had a unique perspective
on the battle, for he was able to see
it from both sides. The overwhelm-
ing impression he creates with this
fascinating account is that this was
a battle the Japanese lost, as much
as the Americans won. The weak-
nesses of the American forces (most
notably a tendency to neglect even
rudimentary rules of camouflage or
take reasonable care when moving
around in the rear areas) were com-
pounded by an almost complete
lack of reliable maps of the area
(but, as Whyte points out, his com-
manding officer didn’t know how
to read maps in any case), but were
overshadowed by the flaws of their
enemies. Timid commanders,
logistical problems, disease, a re-
liance on Great War-style tactics, a
reluctance to use naval units to
make the airfield unuseable to
American aircraft, a tendency to use
light but flexible unit organizations
instead of concentrating strength
against American firepower – all of
these doomed the Japanese effort
to failure. Even so, Whyte identi-
fies a number of opportunities that
the Japanese had to score a deci-
sive win which were not taken. The
conclusion is that the first signifi-
cant reverse inflicted on the Japa-
nese forces was anything but as-
sured.
Indeed, Guadalcanal was such
a good example of how not to run a
campaign that Whyte used it for
teaching purposes when he left ac-
tive duty and went to the Marine
Corps Schools at Quantico, Vir-
ginia; a number of his accounts of
aspects of the campaign were also
published in the Marine Corps
Gazette. In short, he came to re-
gard Guadalcanal as a significant
part of his education, not just as a
soldier but as a student of human
affairs.
SL
* * * * *
Andrew Clark, A Keen Soldier:
The Execution of Second World
War Private Harold Pringle
(Mississauga: Random House of
Canada, 2002), $35.95, 342 pages,
ISBN 0-676-97354-X.
In 1958, Colin McDougall’s novelExecution won the Governor-
General’s Award for fiction. It was
the only book McDougall ever wrote,
describing an event that was seared
into his mind. Once he had ex-
punged that memory by writing the
novel, he was finally able to get on
with his life.
In A Keen Soldier, Andrew
Clark tells the real story behind the
novel: the tragic odyssey of a young
rifleman from the Hastings and
Prince Edward Regiment. In 1940,
Harold and his father William (a
veteran of the Great War) enlisted
in the Hasty Ps, but a year later
William was discharged for being
overage and physically unfit.
Harold, who had coped well with
army life with his father’s steady-
ing presence close at hand, began a
downward spiral. Time and time
again he went AWOL, only getting
out of the glass house by asking to
be sent into action immediately. By
all accounts he performed well as
a soldier in Italy, but his accumu-
lated pay stoppages meant that his
pay was cut to virtually nothing.
After a series of brutal firefights,
Harold told a friend that he wasn’t
willing to be killed for ten cents a
day. On 7 June 1944, he was re-
ported AWOL for the last time. He
headed for Rome and embarked on
the life of crime that would be the
end of him. Pringle and a handful
of other deserters, known as the
Sailor Gang, turned their efforts to
petty crime, black-marketeering,
and stealing and selling supplies.
In late October 1944, their comfort-
able if violent world came crashing
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down. After a night of drinking, a
scuffle ensued between members of
the Sailor Gang; a British deserter
shot and seriously wounded an-
other gang member, a soldier from
Cape Breton Island who died as the
gang was trying to drive him to hos-
pital. To make it look like an or-
ganized crime hit, Pringle and an-
other gang member pumped a cou-
ple of slugs into the body and
dumped it into a field. The mili-
tary police, which had had difficulty
stopping the black market activity,
had no trouble locating the culprits;
in short order, Pringle and the two
other gunmen were in custody and
on trial for their lives. Harold’s
anguished existence came to an end
on 5 July 1945, in front of a firing
squad made up of the last few Ca-
nadian soldiers left in Italy.
This is a fascinating book, but
a difficult one in terms of the moral
issues involved. On the one hand,
Clark makes clear that there was
ample probable doubt in Pringle’s
case; all of the evidence suggested
that the Cape Bretoner was already
dead when Pringle fired into the
body. He was unquestionably guilty
of a long list of crimes, but not of
the capital offense of murder. Fur-
thermore, it is equally clear that
Pringle had to die largely because
the British had been more efficient
in trying and executing the other two
deserters charged for the murder.
A diplomatic storm would have
ensued had Canada declined to ex-
ecute its man for the crime for
which two British soldiers had al-
ready died. And yet, some may ar-
gue that Pringle got everything that
was coming to him. He chose a life
of crime and violence, electing to
let his battalion mates do the fight-
ing while he lived off the avails of
criminal activity in relative comfort
in Rome. No one forced Pringle to
make the choices he did; he was in
all respects the architect of his own
doom.
Aside from a few errors of ba-
sic fact (the Dieppe Raid was not
on 16 August 1943 and the Prin-
cess Pats did not fight in the Boer
War), Clark does a fine job of tell-
ing Pringle’s story with empathy and
sensitivity. It will ultimately be up
to readers to arrive at their own
answers to the moral conundrum
the author poses.
LT
* * * * *
Kevin R. Shackleton, Second to
None: The Fighting 58th
Battalion of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force (Toronto:
Dundurn Press, 2002), $28.99
paper, 362 pages, ISBN 1-55002-
405-1.
The list of First World War bat-talion histories continues to
grow, thanks to this entry by Kevin
Shackleton, the grandson of a mem-
ber of the unit. The 58th (raised in
the Toronto area, primarily by of-
ficers connected with the 38th
Dufferin Rifles) is one of those units
that tends to be forgotten about, in
large part because it produced no
regimental history during the inter-
war years, although regimental of-
ficers contemplated the writing of
such a history in 1939. But from
March 1916, when it first entered
the front lines, to the end of the war,
it was involved in almost every
major engagement of the Canadian
Corps. Like all battalions, the 58th
paid a heavy toll during the war –
493 killed, 264 missing, and 2250
wounded and sick, for a total of
over 3000 casualties. It also pro-
duced many distinguished soldiers,
including Corporal Harry Miner,
who won the Victoria Cross at Ami-
ens on 8 August 1918.
Shackleton follows the format
of the traditional unit history. The
first chapter is devoted to the bat-
talion’s raising, training, and em-
barkation for overseas, and the
balance of the book gives a month-
by-month account of the unit’s ex-
periences. The War Diary provides
the narrative framework, but the
author has expanded it with letters
and diary excerpts from contempo-
rary newspapers and unpublished
collection of battalion members.
This gives the book a personal tone
that is all too often missing from
unit histories published in the in-
terwar period. There are many il-
lustrations and maps, again mostly
drawn from private collections, and
a full honour roll of the unit’s fatal
casualties. All in all, this is a fine
account of a unit that, until now, has
been largely neglected by histori-
ans.
JFV
* * * * *
Jean Edwards Stacey, Memoirs of
a Blue Puttee: The Newfoundland
Regiment in the First World War
(St. John’s: DRC Publishers, 2002),
$16.95 paper, 190 pages, ISBN 0-
9684209-1-5.
In 1914, Newfoundland had apopulation of 263,000. When the
First World War began, 12,426 men
offered to serve King and Country.
Many joined the Newfoundland
Regiment which suffered 1,305
dead and 2,134 wounded, about half
its strength. Jim Stacey, born in
England, came to the colony in
1911. Joining up on 2 September,
he became the 466th member of the
“Blue Puttees,” the name given to
the first 500 volunteers (the desig-
nation comes from the navy blue
material they wrapped around their
legs for protection and support).
Stacey survived the war, after serv-
ing as a runner and mail clerk.
His memoirs have been fleshed
out and given a context by Jean
Stacey. They make interesting and
lively reading. Looking over what
became the battlefield of Beaumont
Hamel on 1 July 1916, Stacey notes
that “everything seemed so quiet
that your thoughts would be taken
away from war.” The writer tells
much about the details of war, such
as how mail was handled and how
runners linked soldiers with each
other. He has a wry sense of hu-
mour, and his stories illustrate how
the Newfoundlanders, brave and
disciplined in battle, beat the mili-
tary system when in training and
out of the line. Confined to barracks
in Edinburgh Castle, the soldiers
literally went over the wall to visit
friends and have a night on the town
before leaving the city.
The regiment went first to Gal-
lipoli, where it covered the with-
drawal in 1915, losing forty-three
members in the process. The
Newfoundlanders gained other bat-
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tle honours on the Western Front.
The text tells how they were ac-
quired, while Stacey’s account fills
in the everyday happenings in and
out of combat. Eating in a dugout,
the writer and his comrades noted
something strange about its floor:
“When we jumped on it, it shook
like jelly. We investigated and found
a dead German under the topsoil.”
The Newfoundland Regiment
fought hard and its members suf-
fered greatly. The book recaptures
the spirit of these brave men. One
photo shows “The Men Who Saved
Monchy,” by holding up a German
advance on 14 April 1917, after the
regiment had again been almost
wiped out. Another, of John
Shiwak, the only Inuk to serve in
the regiment, pictures him in full
Highland dress; he was killed by a
shell near Cambrai in November
1917.
Earl Haig spoke at the unveil-
ing of the monument to the New-
foundland Regiment at Beaumont
Hamel on 7 June 1925. He referred
to the site as a place “where cour-
age, devotion, and self-sacrifice
were poured out, as it seemed at
the moment, for no purpose.” These
words apply to many of the actions
in which the Newfoundlanders
fought.
Memoirs has a somewhat
home-made look, with too much
information crammed into the sec-
tions that connect Stacey’s narra-
tive. But this does not detract from
this very readable account of one
man’s war.
JL
* * * * *
Jan A.F.M. Luijten, Canada and
Noord-Brabant: An Eternal Bond
(Soesterberg, Netherlands:
Uitgeverij Aspekt [distributed in
North America by International
Specialized Book Services], 2002),
$15.00 US paper, 76 pages, ISBN
90-5911-071-4.
Jan Luijten was twelve years oldand living in Bergen op Zoom
in the Netherlands when, in Octo-
ber 1944, a Canadian tank appeared
in the street to liberate the towns-
people. His basement became a
headquarters of sorts for elements
of the Lincoln and Welland Regi-
ment, in part because his father
spoke English fluently and could
help the Canadians navigate their
way around German defences. This
short book is Luijten’s personal
reflection on that experience, and
on a number of sharp skirmishes
that occurred almost in his own
back yard.
The story has been related be-
fore, most notably by Geoffrey
Hayes in his authoritative history
of the Lincs, but Luijten brings
some new twists to the telling. His
affection and gratitude for the lib-
erators comes through clearly, and
indeed provided the motivation for
researching and writing this book.
AF
* * * * *
John Nichol and Tony Rennell, The
Last Escape: The Untold Story of
Allied Prisoners of War in Ger-
many, 1944-45 (London: Penguin,
2002), £20.00, 471 pages, ISBN 0-
670-91094-5.
This book starts with a falsepremise: that the forced
marches of tens of thousands of
Allied POWs during the dying days
of the Third Reich represents an
“untold story,” lost from the his-
tory books until they were redis-
covered by the authors and brought
to the attention of a new generation
of readers. In fact, the marches
have been written about extensively
since the end of the war, in mem-
oirs (perhaps the best Canadian
memoir is Robert Buckham’s
Forced March to Freedom, first
published in 1985) and mono-
graphs in Canada, Britain, Aus-
tralia, and the United States; the
only people who will consider this
story “untold” are those who are
unfamiliar with POW literature gen-
erally.
That caveat aside, this is a very
fine telling of a very dramatic tale.
As the British, American, and Rus-
sian forces inexorably closed in on
the German heartland, the Nazis
went to great lengths to move huge
columns of POWs out of their
camps and away from the liberat-
ing armies. Their motives are un-
clear. Some in the high command
wanted to use prisoners as hostages,
to secure better terms when the war
finally ended. Others may have con-
sidered using them as human
shields, while the possibility of ex-
ecuting them en masse was appar-
ently also discussed. In other cases,
the columns marched around aim-
lessly, the guards and command-
ers evidently having no clear idea
of where they should go or what they
should do. All of this meant untold
suffering for the prisoners. The
winter was one of the harshest in
years, and the cold quickly took a
toll on men whose physical condi-
tion had already been weakened by
captivity. The Germans provided
little food and even less shelter, and
a spray of gunfire often awaited
those unfortunate souls who could
not keep up with the pace because
of the dysentery that swept through
many groups of prisoners. Some
columns spent weeks on the road,
covering hundreds of miles in the
worst possible conditions. An ad-
ditional hazard was provided by
Allied aircraft; desperately search-
ing for potential targets on the
roads of Germany, British and
American fighter aircraft strafed
many columns of marchers and
killed dozens of POWs, some of
whom had survived five years of
captivity, only to fall to the guns of
their own countrymen in the final
days of the war.
Nichol, a former Royal Air
Force officer who became a pris-
oner during the Gulf War, knows
of what he writes, and there is a
great deal of sensitivity and empa-
thy in the story. He and Rennell also
succeed in telling both the British
and American dimensions of the
story equally effectively. They have
mined a broad range of sources,
from government documents to the
unpublished accounts of the pris-
oners themselves, to produce a nar-
rative that is exciting, compelling,
and arresting. If it is not true that
the story is untold, one can at least
say that it has never been better told.
JFV
* * * * *
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Stephen Kimber, Sailors, Slackers
and Blind Pigs: Halifax at War
(Toronto: Doubleday Canada,
2002), $34.95, 284 pages, ISBN 0-
385-25993-X.
The Canadian home front dur-ing the Second World War has
had a rather sparse historiography.
Stephen Kimber’s Sailors, Slack-
ers and Blind Pigs provides a much
needed  study of one rather excep-
tional home front experience. Hali-
fax, as the dust cover notes, “was
the only Canadian city directly
caught up in the drama, danger,
death and disaster of our last ‘good’
war.” Kimber, the Director of the
School of Journalism at the Uni-
versity of King’s College in Halifax,
interviewed numerous “duration
only” and lifelong Haligonians in an
attempt to reconstruct the wartime
experience in the city which culmi-
nated in an explosion of looting and
drunken rioting in May 1945. Us-
ing a simple chronological organi-
zation, Kimber weaves an engross-
ing narrative which traces the var-
ied wartime experiences of
Haligonians as his interviewees re-
membered them. Recognizing the
pitfalls of oral history, Kimber
notes that he “attempted to verify
and supplement their recollections
with supporting interviews, docu-
ments, letters and news accounts,
as well as the published work of
later historians of the navy, the war,
the era and Halifax itself” but did
not include citations “since it is not
intended as an academic history”
(1).
Despite that, Kimber’s book,
with its rich prose and valuable oral
testimony from members of a gen-
eration whose numbers are sadly
dwindling by each passing year, is
one that will appeal to the casual
reader and to historians alike. In
particular, his discussion of the ri-
ots of 1945 and their causes adds
a useful perspective to Stanley
Redman’s seminal studies of the
public violence which accompanied
VE Day. Kimber contends that the
riots were the product of long-term
tension between Haligonians and
servicemen over what the latter per-
ceived to be discriminatory policies
and pricing. This simmering dis-
content exploded into rioting,
Kimber contends, after the Halifax
civic elite excluded military person-
nel from the city’s VE Day celebra-
tions and, to add insult to injury,
recommended that all recreation
services also be closed during the
celebration. These decisions, com-
bined with a boiling resentment
among many “civilians in uniform”
over the continuation (and tighten-
ing) of military discipline at the
same time as the war was winding
down, prompted the disturbances
which caused both property dam-
age and tarnished the reputation of
the RCN. Interestingly, despite call-
ing into question the finding of the
Kellock Royal Commission on the
Halifax Disorders that civilian-mili-
tary tension had little to do with
rioting, Kimber remains ambivalent
about the role of the Naval com-
mander, Admiral Leonard Murray,
in the affair. Although he rejects the
postwar scapegoating of Murray as
excessive given that “the riots had
plenty of other authors” (such as a
federal government that did little
to aid Halifax in accommodating the
thousands of people during war-
time, and a city of Halifax that
“seemed more interested in the
sailors’ paycheques than in the sail-
ors themselves”), Kimber does see
Murray as “the author of his own
misfortune” by not using his rank,
position, and influence to bring his
service personnel under control
(312). Ultimately, Kimber concludes
that Haligonians and Canadians gen-
erally have largely forgotten Hali-
fax’s wartime experience in favour
of the city’s role in the Titanic dis-
aster and its near-destruction in
1917, suggesting that “because what
was arguably Halifax’s finest hour
on the world stage ended so inglo-
riously, Hailgonians prefer to gloss
over the story” (319). By writing
such a well-researched and acces-
sible history, Stephen Kimber has
gone a long way toward reestablish-
ing wartime Halifax in the collec-
tive memory, warts and all.
DR
* * * * *
John Prados, The Blood Road:
The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the
Vietnam War (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1999), $34.95, 432
pages, ISBN 0-471-25465-7.
This latest offering from JohnPrados examines Hanoi’s
Truong Son Strategic Supply Route,
a Cold War flashpoint better known
by its American nickname, The Ho
Chi Minh Trail. Starting out as noth-
ing more than a compass bearing
along the unexplored Annamite
Mountain chain, it eventually grew
into a full-blown highway support-
ing the Communist reunification
effort in the south. It is an impor-
tant topic given that the war was
settled on, around, and over the
trail. Prados sets out to offer a co-
herent treatment of what the sup-
ply route represented to the vast
array of participants involved in the
Vietnam War. This is a welcome
contribution that places the story
of the trail into an international
perspective.
Some Americans still believe
that the war could have been won
had the trail been cut. But Prados
convincingly demonstrates the pov-
erty of that theory. Indeed, Hanoi’s
resolve remained undeterred de-
spite the American use of com-
mando raids, armed reconnais-
sance, gunship surveillance, elec-
tronic sensors, outright invasion,
and a decade-long bombing cam-
paign that surpassed the tonnage
dropped during the Second World
War. Today, the trail is still covered
with charred vehicles, aircraft
wrecks, destroyed villages, and
seventy-two graveyards that belie
the war’s intensity. Prados’ point is
clear: Hanoi prevailed despite the
best efforts of the United States
military to stem the flow of supplies
to the insurgents in the south.
Prados has done a fine job re-
searching this book. He exhibits a
command of such diverse sources
as are needed to analyze the US
protest movement, army special
operations, and the nuances of
Sino-Soviet relations and their af-
fect on American strategy. While the
tales of high-level military and dip-
lomatic strategies are all here, the
5
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major contributions are the ac-
counts of the North Vietnamese
workers who built and maintained
the trail. These were often coastal
urbanites sent off to jungles where
they faced harsh terrain, tigers,
poisonous snakes, disease, and
eventually American firepower.
Prados sheds needed light into the
dark recesses of Hanoi’s wartime
experience and more work of this
type is needed if we are to under-
stand this central Cold War event.
It is surprising that Prados ne-
glected to include a bibliography to
serve as a gateway for interested
researchers. Overall, however, the
author has done a commendable
job and has added much needed
clarity to our understanding of this
subject.
BC
* * * * *
Bob Stahl, Fugitives: Evading and
Escaping the Japanese
(Lexington: University Press of Ken-
tucky [distributed in Canada by
Scholarly Book Services],
2001),$37.25, 143 pages, ISBN 0-
8131-2224-4.
This short account is based onthe wartime memoir of Jordan
Hamner, an American mining engi-
neer who travelled to the Philippines
shortly before the American entry
into the Second World War to man-
age a gold mine. His mine was on
the island of Masbate, between
Luzon and Mindanao, and suffi-
ciently off the beaten track that the
Japanese initially appeared to have
little interest in it. For some time,
Hamner and his fellow American
mine managers were left unmolested
but eventually most of them de-
cided to take to the hills, assuming
that the Japanese would not leave
them alone indefinitely. They were
right; those who elected to stay put
were shortly interned, spending
much of the war in Santo Tomas
internment camp.
Hamner’s plan, however, was to
work his way south through the
Philippine Islands and eventually
find a boat to sail to Australia, and
the description of his odyssey
makes fascinating reading. What is
most striking is the absence of Japa-
nese forces on the islands he vis-
ited on his escape. He and his com-
panions saw the occasional Japa-
nese vessel or aircraft, and spot-
ted a few soldiers off in the dis-
tance at one point, but they were
really never seriously threatened
with capture. On the contrary, the
greatest danger was posed not by
the Japanese, but by unpredictable
Philippine islanders. This puts the
occupation of the Philippines in a
new light; of the hundreds of is-
lands that make up the Philippine
archipelago, only a handful of the
larger ones were consistently occu-
pied by the Japanese. On the vast
majority, life went on pretty much
unchanged.
After reaching Australia,
Hamner joined the American army
and eventually returned to the Phil-
ippines to set up coast watching
outposts. That, regrettably, is an-
other story entirely.
JFV
* * * * *
Barney Danson, with Curtis Fahey,
Not Bad for a Sergeant: The
Memoirs of Barney Danson
(Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2002),
$39.99, 303 pages, ISBN 1-55002-
404-3.
Only two chapters cover the mili-tary dimensions of Danson’s
long career in business and the
public service, but they are enough
to make this a very interesting
memoir. A prewar member of the
Queen’s Own Rifles, Danson was
mobilized in June 1940 (after vol-
unteering for an abortive Finnish
expeditionary force in a desperate
attempt to see some action) and
eventually reached Normandy in
early August 1944. After four years
of training, his shooting war was a
short one; just a week after land-
ing in France, a piece of shrapnel
ricocheted off his helmet and
worked its way through his eye
socket and into his mouth. Listed
as “dangerously ill as a result of
wounds,” Danson was in fact very
much alive, and made a remark-
able recovery to return to his war
bride and son whom he had never
met. The wound, however, ended
his first career in the military.
His second began in 1976 when
he became Minister of National
Defence under Pierre Trudeau. By
his own admission it was a posi-
tion he had long coveted, and it
fully lived up to his expectations.
Danson admits that the three years
he spent in National Defence were
the most satisfying of his political
career, and most readers who have
followed the defence issues of the
period would agree that he was well
suited to the job and performed it
admirably. His one regret (some-
thing that could be uttered by a
dozen or more defence ministers)
was “the general lack of interest in
military matters in peacetime on the
part of my colleagues in govern-
ment, the media, and the public at
large” (241). He has high praise for
the few journalists (Peter Ward, Jo
Ann Gosselin, Doug Fisher, and
Peter Worthington) who took any
interest in military matters, and for
the historians (he mentions
Granatstein, Bercuson, Morton,
and Copp) who have done so much
to revitalize the study of military
history.
AF
* * * * *
James J. Cooke, Billy Mitchell
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub-
lishers, 2002), $49.95 US, 305
pages, ISBN 1-58826-082-8.
The sensational 1925 court mar-tial of the American airpower
advocate Billy Mitchell has been the
subject of historical studies, Hol-
lywood films, and, as James Cooke
believes, a great deal of myth mak-
ing. In this revisionist biography
which seeks to relocate “the man
himself” (x) in a study of Mitchell,
Cooke, Professor Emeritus of His-
tory at the University of Mississippi
and a specialist in the American
military during the First World War,
discovered the “dangers in writing
a biography of a historical figure
when he has been perceived as a
‘prophet without honor’” (ix). In-
deed, it is doubly difficult to delve
into Mitchell s life and show that
he was not all that he was thought
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to be when his ideas rest at the core
of the identity of a powerful organi-
zation such as the United States Air
Force and when one’s audience is
already familiar with Gary Coop-
er’s idealized portrayal of his pro-
fessional martyrdom.
In the face of these challenges,
Professor Cooke has produced a
useful (if not always riveting) biog-
raphy of Billy Mitchell which seeks
to debunk some of the mythology
surrounding his airpower battles of
the 1920s within the context of
Mitchell’s life. Of particular inter-
est to students of airpower is
Cooke’s chapters which explore
Mitchell’s central role in develop-
ing the American Army Air Service
on the Western Front during 1917
and 1918. Building on his earlier
The U.S. Air Service in the Great
War (1996) and Pershing and His
Generals (1997), Cooke offers a
nuanced view of the wartime devel-
opment of the airpower ideas which
eventually led to Mitchell’s profes-
sional demise. He argues that de-
spite the popular image of Mitchell
as a “prophet” of strategic air
power, he “remained fairly ortho-
dox in his views of battle, looking
primarily at the battle at hand” (2).
Cooke asserts that Mitchell “di-
verged from the doctrines of the
Great War mostly in his emerging
concept of an independent air force
[fuelled by a 1919 visit with Church-
ill and Trenchard], which eventu-
ally developed into his belief that
massive air assets could by them-
selves affect the outcome of not only
a battle, but a war” (2, 107).
Cooke concludes his work with
a detailed analysis of Mitchell’s
airpower experiments such as the
famous bombing of the battleship
Ostfriesland in July 1921 and cul-
minating in his trial four years later.
He asserts that Mitchell’s push for
an independent air force evolved
into an ill-considered “crusade
against the navy” which “clouded
his vision and his usually fertile
imagination regarding the potential
of the aircraft carrier and the sub-
marine” (2). Indeed, Cooke paints
a rather pathetic figure of a con-
ceited, arrogant, and intellectually
limited Mitchell as revealed by his
often erratic behaviour during and
after his trial; this characterization
provides a useful counterpoint to
the mythic figure portrayed by Gary
Cooper in 1955. Although, as Cooke
admits, it is tempting as a histo-
rian and biographer to indulge in a
bit of iconoclasm with the life of
one’s subject, this biography suc-
ceeds in providing a fair and bal-
anced perspective of an airpower
visionary and his ideas by stripping
away the decades of myth and opin-
ion and replacing it with what had
been lacking: a reliance on the his-
torical evidence.
DR
* * * * *
David N. Spires, Patton’s Air
Force: Forging a Legendary Air-
Ground Team (Washington:
Smithsonian Institute Press [dis-
tributed in Canada by Scholarly
Book Services], 2002) $54.50, 377
pages, ISBN 1-5609-8087-2.
Arguably one of the significantfactors in the Allied success in
Europe in 1944-45 was the integra-
tion of tactical air power with
ground forces. There has been rela-
tively little produced about this
subject however, and for this rea-
son, David Spires’ most recent book
Patton’s Air Force is a welcome
addition to the available literature.
By August 1944, the Allies had
one British and four American
fighter-bomber tactical air com-
mands supporting specific armies
in North-West Europe. These were
permanent groupings, and in the
case of Patton’s Third Army, Gen-
eral Otto Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air
Command provided close air sup-
port. The relationship was a close
one and it is the nature of this rela-
tionship that forms the core of
Spires’ book.
  Weyland was in a difficult
position as commander of the XIX
Tactical Air Command, being re-
quired to answer both to Patton and
the 9th Air Force. He was also ex-
pected to adhere to official US Army
Air Force doctrine which ranked
close air support of ground forces
as the last priority and which main-
tained that close air support mis-
sions were the least efficient use of
air resources. However, both Patton
and Weyland were flexible, and
doctrine was modified as neces-
sary. Weyland was also willing to
stretch command and control doc-
trine to suit the situation. By the
spring of 1945, overwhelming Al-
lied air superiority allowed him to
decentralize close air support re-
sources to Third Army corps and
divisions which in effect, gave them
their own air arm.
As the author notes, the Third
Army/XIX Tactical Air Command
was perhaps the most spectacular
air-ground team on the Allied side.
The relationship between Patton and
Weyland was founded on mutual
trust, respect and a common mis-
sion-directed interest, attributes,
which Spires considers as the ba-
sic lesson for tactical air power.
Patton’s Air Force is well written
and researched and is recom-
mended for use by students of the
1944-45 campaign in North-West
Europe.
RH
* * * * *
Robert C. Kensett, A Walk in the
Valley (Burnstown, ON: General
Store Publishing, 2003), $19.95
paper, 119 pages, ISBN 1-894263-
76-6.
Robert Kensett had what mightbe described as a short, sharp
war. He was sworn into the RCAF
in February 1943 and was eventu-
ally posted to 158 Squadron RAF,
at Lissett in Yorkshire, in March
1945. Kensett was the navigator of
a Halifax heavy bomber crew that
was about half Canadian. Their first
operation, a raid on Essen, oc-
curred on 11 March, and the crew
then faced a punishing schedule
that saw them complete five opera-
tions in five days; they flew four
more raids, the last being on 18
April, before the war ended.
It is the little details that make
the book such an interesting read.
Kensett admits that his crew, while
it functioned effectively and effi-
ciently, was not especially close in
personal terms, the exception be-
ing the author’s enduring friendship
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with his Canadian pilot. He was also
fortunate to have close relatives in
England with whom he spent his
leave, as he was spared the experi-
ence of sampling the debaucheries
of wartime London. And for read-
ers who have always wondered
about such things and never known
how to ask, there is a full descrip-
tion of the obstacles involved in
making one’s way to the toilet while
on an operational flight in a Hali-
fax!
Kensett closes with some inter-
esting observations that are clearly
born of a lifetime of reflecting on
the war’s impact on him: “It was a
time in your life that was unique.
When the war ended and you re-
turned to your ordinary job, you
could not recapture those feelings;
but having once experienced them,
you were never the same.”
SL
* * * * *
James Jay Carafano, After D-Day:
Operation Cobra and the
Normandy Breakout (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000),
$29.95 US, 295 pages, ISBN 1-
55587-885-7.
In recent years, there has been con-siderable interest among histori-
ans in the Normandy Campaign.
Much of the literature produced,
however, has been focussed on
Anglo-Canadian operations, and for
this reason, James Jay Carafano’s
well-written book on Operation
Cobra and the American breakout
from Normandy 25-30 July 1944
will be welcomed by students of the
Normandy Campaign.
Operation Cobra involved two
armoured and four infantry divi-
sions in a hard-fought, six-day bat-
tle which, in the author’s opinion,
broke the stalemate on the western
front, precipitating the collapse of
the German army in the west, the
liberation of Paris, and the invasion
of Germany. Despite this, Operation
Cobra has, until now, never been
the subject of a specific study.
Traditional explanations for
American successes in Normandy
include air power, logistics, and
technological innovations such as
the Rhino tank. In Carafano’s opin-
ion however, these explanations are
myths and the explanation lies in-
stead in battlefield leadership as
well as “operational flexibility,” the
ability of commanders at all levels
to change the course of a campaign.
This flexibility was not part of offi-
cial doctrine, but was based on les-
sons learned by the US Army in the
difficult fighting after D-Day.
The discussion of leadership in
After D-Day is not confined to sen-
ior commanders, but includes field
grade commanders at the combat
command, regimental, and battal-
ion levels. Carafano considers these
appointments to have been critical
to the American success and he
highlights their unique contribution
to building operational flexibility by
tracing the key events of Operation
Cobra.
This book is a traditional mili-
tary history that focuses on the com-
manders at all levels and the actual
course of the battle. It is well re-
searched and authoritative and is
recommended for use by general
readers as well as military histori-
ans.
RH
* * * * *
Tony Banham, Not the Slightest
Chance: The Defence of Hong
Kong, 1941 (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2003), $85.00, 431 pages,
ISBN 0-7748-1044-0.
The fall of Hong Kong remainsone of the most contentious epi-
sodes in the Canadian military ex-
perience, and in the Second World
War generally. The book’s title
comes from Winston Churchill’s
famous comment that the colony
stood “not the slightest chance” of
withstanding a stout Japanese at-
tack. The comment proved to be all
too prophetic.
Banham has assembled the
most comprehensive account of the
battle ever published. It is in a day-
by-day format, with each day’s
events described (in many cases)
down to the minutes. A full roll of
the day’s casualties, including Hong
Kong Volunteers and civilians, by
name and unit, follows each chap-
ter, and the many maps allow the
reader to follow the course of the
battle. Further exhaustive statisti-
cal summaries are provided in the
many appendices.
Banham’s research is impres-
sive, and so complete that the book
is more a compendium of detail
that a monograph arguing a thesis.
But he does have some interesting
observations to make about the na-
ture of the defence, noting that the
battle might have progressed dif-
ferently had the British and Cana-
dian units had more time to inte-
grate. Still, he is careful not to sug-
gest that Hong Kong could have been
saved, only that a greater number
of Japanese attackers might have
been killed. He leaves the last word
to a member of the Hong Kong Po-
lice Force who echoed Churchill:
“All the time we knew, or at least I
did, that we were fighting a losing
battle. It was so different to what
I’d expected. We didn’t stand a
chance.”
LT
* * * * *
Russell A. Hart, Clash of Arms:
How the Allies Won in Normandy
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub-
lishers, 2001) $79.95 US, 469
pages, ISBN 1-55587-947-0.
This book is concerned with theAmerican, British, Canadian,
and German armies in Normandy
–  their flexibility, their ability to
learn from their combat experi-
ences, and their ability to adapt to
new circumstances. Part I deals with
how the various armies prepared
themselves for the war, while Part
II examines the performance of each
army in the Normandy Campaign.
Hart believes that the first and
most important ingredient for mili-
tary effectiveness is a sound, un-
ambiguous, and realistic doctrine
that emphasizes flexibility, adapt-
ability, and the need for critical self-
appraisal. In brief, he argues that
the US Army had the soundest doc-
trine and was the quickest to adapt
both doctrine and technique based
on battlefield experience. In con-
trast, the German Army, which also
had an effective doctrine, was fa-
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tally handicapped by ideological
beliefs and logistical weaknesses,
while the British and Canadian Ar-
mies, with their tradition of defeat
between 1939 and 1942, were con-
servative by nature and suffered
from a flawed doctrine that empha-
sised attrition and overwhelming
firepower.
The subject of how armies pre-
pare for war and how they adapt
during conflict is an important one
and Hart has much to offer, par-
ticularly on the British Army. Un-
fortunately, his arguments on the
adaptability of the American and
German Armies are not new, and
his comment that it took six years
for the Allies to overcome the quali-
tative edge of the German Army, is
belied by the fact that the campaign
in north-west Europe lasted only 11
months.
Clash of Arms is marred by
poor quality maps and a repetitive
style that detracts from his argu-
ment. Having said this, the book
contains a considerable amount of
interesting detail and in some re-
spects, is a useful contribution to
the ongoing discussion of the Nor-
mandy Campaign.
RH
* * * * *
Blake Heathcote, Testaments of
Honour: Personal Histories of
Canada’s War Veterans (Toronto:
Doubleday Canada, 2002), $45.00,
341 pages, ISBN 0-385-65846-X.
One of the most aggressivelymarketed military history
books of last year was Blake
Heathcote, Testaments of Honour,
a substantial, lavish volume of per-
sonal accounts by Canadian veter-
ans of the Second World War. Some
of the life stories – like those of
Jack Gouinlock, Barney Danson,
and Alex Colville – have been told
in other published works, while
other biographies shed light on well
known events. The bulk of the sto-
ries, however, are presented for the
first time, and are culled from
some 150 video interviews
Heathcote conducted with Canadian
veterans. He has transformed the
interviews into first-person ac-
counts, producing a series of 24
biographical sketches.
Every service and campaign is
covered, and there are many won-
derful anecdotes included. John
Weir was surely one of the only
Canadian servicemen to have at-
tended a Nazi Party rally before the
war (his father travelled frequently
to Germany on business). Don
Cheney recalls the difficult decision
of whether or not to accept an invi-
tation to join 617 Squadron RAF,
the elite dam-busting bomber
squadron known as the Death or
Glory Boys – the young crew even-
tually decided to join the challenge.
Bob Grant joined the Fort Garry
Horse in February 1941 and didn’t
get to use a working tank until late
1942; he recalled that, for parades
they used clapped out French tanks
from the First World War; the en-
gines didn’t work, but the troops
stood in front of them “and pre-
tended we were an armoured regi-
ment.”
Testaments of Honour follows
a format that has been used fre-
quently in the past. Heathcote’s
book does it better than most.
CA
* * * * *
Bruce W. Menning, Bayonets Be-
fore Bullets: The Imperial Rus-
sian Army 1861-1914
(Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2000) $22.95 US paper, 334
pages, ISBN 0-253-21380-0.
Bruce Menning’s book is a well-written, comprehensive study
of a subject that has not received
much attention from Western writ-
ers. Concerned with the organiza-
tion and military art of the Impe-
rial Russian Army from the
Crimean reforms to the beginning
of the First World War, Bayonets
Before Bullets is a valuable source
for historians of Imperial Russia
and its army.
Bruce Menning not only pro-
vides an account of the Imperial
Russian Army in the Russo-Turk-
ish War of 1877-78 and the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-05, but also
discusses changes in technology,
organization, and operational think-
ing that preceded and followed each
war. Contrary to popular opinion,
the Imperial Russian Army invested
heavily in new technology and army
reforms. However, neither the tech-
nology nor the reforms were en-
tirely effective, mainly because of
inherent problems with linkages,
that is, the ability to match policy
and military capability. Logistics is
the most obvious example of the
Russian failure to establish appro-
priate linkages, but the problem
existed elsewhere. Between 1874
and 1904, a gap opened between the
teachings of General MI
Dragomirov at the tactical level and
the strategic doctrine taught by
General Leer at the Nicholas Acad-
emy. This gap that was not filled
until the 1920s with the recognition
of operational art as the vital link
between strategy and battlefield tac-
tics. There were a number of rea-
sons for the problems with linkages
in the Imperial Russian Army, and
Menning discusses at length the
Czarist political structure in which
change took place and the foibles
of the senior officers involved.
Bayonets Before Bullets is an
authoritative book that provides a
clear and logical explanation of the
development of the Russian Army
before 1914 and is recommended
for use by general readers as well
as students of the Russian Empire.
RH
* * * * *
Michael D. Stevenson, Canada’s
Greatest Wartime Muddle: Na-
tional Selective Service and the
Mobilization of Human Re-
sources during World War II
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Univer-
sity Press, 2001), $55.00, 235
pages, ISBN 0-7735-2263-8.
Canada’s mobilization effort inthe Second World War is often
portrayed as the successful organi-
zation and management of the na-
tion’s human and material re-
sources by competent experts,
headed by Prime Minister Macken-
zie King. Canada’s Greatest War-
time Muddle challenges this notion
through a detailed analysis of the
role of the National Selective Serv-
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ice (NSS) in mobilizing and man-
aging Canada’s human resources.
Created to manage and direct
Canada’s domestic manpower, the
NSS in Stevenson’s view was gen-
erally ineffective. Despite enacting
the legal apparatus to give the Ca-
nadian government extraordinary
control over mobilization of the
nation’s resources throughout the
war, civilian officials were hesitant
to use this machinery to its full
potential. This lack of conviction on
the part of King’s officials prompted
the resignation of the first NSS di-
rector, Elliot Little, merely two
months after the NSS’s creation.
His replacement, Arthur
MacNamara, supported King’s phi-
losophies and throughout his direc-
torship promoted compromise and
volunteerism over compulsion and
centralization.
The government’s hierarchy
also prevented the NSS from func-
tioning effectively. The decision-
making power to close non-essen-
tial industry remained with the
Wartime Prices and Trade Board;
this meant that the NSS did not have
the freedom to direct Canada’s
manpower as it saw fit. In addition,
there was rarely any coordination
between the departments responsi-
ble for Canada’s domestic war ef-
fort. The impact of this on the NSS
was to transform it into a mainly
regional, rather than centralized,
body relying on Regional Advisory
Boards to enact policy as they in-
terpreted it.
Canada’s Greatest Wartime
Muddle is also able to demonstrate,
through case studies of Native Ca-
nadians, Nova Scotian coal miners,
women, and meatpackers, that the
public also mounted organized and
effective opposition towards the
NSS due to a general resentment
of the compulsory nature of its
policies. This combination of diffi-
culties created by government
policy, wavering officials, and pub-
lic reaction meant that Canada’s
mobilization effort was actually one
of gradualism and compromise, not
the highly organized and centralized
effort that has previously been de-
picted.
HM
* * * * *
Raymond P. Heard, A Prisoner of
War Diary: The Ray Heard
Memoirs, 1939-45 (Red Deer, AB:
Central Alberta Historical Society
and Central Alberta Regional
Museums Network, 2003), $24.95
paper, 243 pages, ISBN 0-929123-
12-3.
Ray Heard was a young Englishnewspaperman who enlisted in
the RAF Volunteer Reserve before
the war, and flew Short
Sunderlands and Bristol Bombay’s
before being shot down and cap-
tured in the Western Desert in No-
vember 1941. He kept diaries dur-
ing his captivity which he carefully
secreted from his captors and, af-
ter he eventually emigrated to
Canada, deposited them with the
Red Deer and District Archives.
It is an odd combination of di-
ary and later reflection, but the for-
mat does allow Heard to mull over
his experiences. He has some very
pointed things to say about Mid-
East Command on the RAF, which
he believes was ill-organized and
committed aircraft to operations
for which they were poorly suited
and which had little chance of suc-
cess. A perfect example of this was
the mission on which Heard was
captured, when his antiquated
transport aircraft was shot down
with a load of paratroopers. He also
recalls the bizarre situation at
Stalag III Luckenwalde, near Ber-
lin, at the end of the war, when the
Russians who liberated the camp
refused to release the prisoners
into the hands of the Americans.
The impasse lasted almost a month,
and nearly brought the Russian and
American units to blows.
Heard’s diary ends in June
1945, when he was trying to adjust
to normal civilian life. He reflected
then that captivity taught him to
appreciate what many people take
for granted, and that it also ena-
bled many men to begin preparing
themselves for postwar careers.
Clearly, he has come to terms with
his 3 ½ years of purgatory and can
now see it as a positive, if not pleas-
ant, period in his life.
JFV
* * * * *
John Mosier, The Myth of the
Great War: How the Germans Won
the Battles and How the Ameri-
cans Saved the Allies, A New
Military History (New York:
HarperCollins, 2001) $44.95, 381
pages, ISBN 0-06-019676-9.
In contrast to the British Expedi-tionary Force, very little has been
produced in recent years on the
American Expeditionary Force.
John Mosier’s latest book The Myth
of the Great War therefore is a
welcome contribution to First
World War historiography. The au-
thor, an English professor at Loyola
University in New Orleans, has
taught primarily European litera-
ture and film, but developed an in-
terest in military history after cre-
ating an interdisciplinary curricu-
lum for the study of the two world
wars. This is his first book on mili-
tary history and he is currently at
work on a revisionist history of the
Second World War.
The title of the book summa-
rizes Mosier’s views: the Allies
were inept and consistently lost
their battles to a technically and
technologically superior German
force; it was the intervention of the
Americans in strength from the
summer of 1918 onwards that
proved to be the decisive factor in
the war.
Drawing from a variety of
French and German secondary
sources, Mosier offers a fresh per-
spective on a subject that, for the
most part (at least in the English
language), has been centred on the
British Expeditionary Force. Unfor-
tunately, his book is marred by in-
consistencies and a reliance on a
select range of secondary sources,
most of which were apparently se-
lected to demonstrate that the Al-
lies were inept from the beginning
and, despite heavy losses, failed to
learn from their experiences. Much
of Mosier’s assessment of the Brit-
ish Expeditionary Force, for exam-
ple, is based on Denis Winter’s po-
lemic Haig’s Command, and no
attempt seems to have been made
to consider more balanced studies
of command, technology, and tac-
tics. Some of the sources consulted
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appear to have no relevance to the
Great War, such as Feasby’s Offi-
cial History of the Canadian Medi-
cal Services 1939-1945. Nor have
all relevant sources been consulted;
Duiguid’s official history of the Ca-
nadian Expeditionary Force was
cited but, strangely, Nicholson’s is
not. Mosier does not cite any pri-
mary sources and it would appear
that his book is based entirely on a
select range of secondary sources.
Much of what Mosier has to say
is overstated. In his introduction
(5), he notes that the Central Pow-
ers eliminated a major adversary
with each year of the war, starting
with Belgium in 1914. Unfortu-
nately, it is stretching a point to
classify Belgium, Serbia, and Ru-
mania as major adversaries and
Italy was not eliminated in 1917 as
he suggests. Elsewhere, Mosier
claims that the British Expedition-
ary Force was finished as an offen-
sive force at the end of March 1918
(318), a conclusion that seems to
be at odds with the outstanding
achievements of the BEF during the
Hundred Days. Mosier does not
ignore the Hundred Days altogether,
but claims that the Battle of Ami-
ens was successful only because the
Germans had started to withdraw.
In effect, the retreating Germans
retained the initiative and, as he
notes, had the option of turning and
destroying their opponents at any
time.
Chapter Two of the book is en-
titled “Germany and the Develop-
ment of Combined Arms Tactics”
but is concerned only with the
Schlieffen Plan and the development
of both French and German artil-
lery. Much is made of the high rate
of fire and accuracy of the French
75mm field gun, but the author
overlooks the fact that rapid fire
was possible for short periods only,
because of overheating and loss of
accuracy. Mosier also comments on
the accuracy of predicted shooting,
but fails to note that it became pos-
sible during the war only because
of the introduction of accurate map-
ping, calibration of guns, and cor-
rection factors for muzzle velocity,
charge temperature, and atmos-
pheric conditions, innovations
which belie his argument that the
Allies failed to learn from their ex-
periences. Artillery command and
control arrangements are also dis-
cussed, and the author concludes
that the German army was superior
because the guns were “organic to
their administrative structure” (48).
The term used is an odd one, im-
plying as it does that the artillery
formed part of the logistical struc-
ture, but what he means is that ar-
tillery units fitted into the organi-
zation of formations from division
to army. However, this was com-
mon to all nations and it is not clear
why this arrangement made the
German army superior.
Mosier places considerable
stress on the relative casualty rates
between the protagonists. While it
is agreed that, by and large, the
Allies suffered more casualties, this
was not necessarily attributable
solely to Allied incompetence and
bungling as he suggests. For much
of the war, the Germans were on
the defensive with a correspondingly
lower casualty rate. It is worth not-
ing that at the Battle of Verdun,
where both sides were attacking at
various periods, French and Ger-
man casualties were roughly equal.
Without entering into a prolonged
discussion of casualties, it is diffi-
cult to reconcile the number of fa-
talities cited by Mosier with figures
available from the Volksbund
Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge or
the Commonwealth War Graves
Commission which commemorates
the missing and the dead by name.
While it is difficult to disagree
with the author’s contention that the
arrival of American Forces in
France in large numbers was deci-
sive, he does not discuss the issue
of whether it was the American
presence or their performance in
battle that was so conclusive. There
is a need for a balanced scholarly
work on the American Expedition-
ary Force and unfortunately,
Mosier’s book does not fill this gap.
On the other hand, despite its
faults, The Myth of the Great War
offers a different view on a subject
traditionally discussed from a Brit-
ish or French point of view. Those
seeking a balanced account of the
Allied and German performance
will be disappointed, but those
seeking a new perspective will find
much to consider.
RH
* * * * *
Brent Byron Watson, Far Eastern
Tour: The Canadian Infantry in
Korea, 1950-1953 (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2002), $34.95, 238 pages,  ISBN 0-
7735-2372-3.
Despite a number of popular ac-counts of the Canadian infan-
try in Korea, there remains a dearth
of academic literature about the re-
alities and practical experiences of
the Canadian Army in Canada’s first
major United Nations mission.
Watson seeks to dispel the common
portrayal of the men who served in
the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade
Group as undesirables or “bums
from the slums” and provide an
account of their experiences
through the perspective of the
“lowly soldier.”
Far Eastern Tour examines the
attitudes and decisions of the Ca-
nadian government towards its for-
eign policy and the Korean War to
demonstrate that the difficulties ex-
perienced by the soldiers from re-
cruitment right through to their
return home were unnecessary. The
accounts of soldiers’ memories are
effectively intertwined with the nar-
rative on government policy to show
the direct impact of government
attitudes and decisions on the sol-
dier in the field. From training to
weaponry to non-combat needs,
Canadian foreign and military
policy throughout the three-year
duration of the Korean War re-
mained based on budgetary con-
cerns and the assumption that the
Canadian military would be partici-
pating in a European-style conflict.
The effect of Canadian policy on the
infantryman was needless hardship
through a lack of knowledge of the
terrain or foreign peoples, and a
lack of both comforts and necessi-
ties in the field that had disastrous
results on the health and morale of
the men.
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At times the work, as the au-
thor himself acknowledges, ap-
pears to be a list of one criticism
after another towards the Canadian
government. Notwithstanding, most
of the criticisms are unquestionably
warranted and the author aptly
demonstrates known alternatives
available at the time (and requests
for them by officials in Korea, such
as Major W.H. Pope) were either not
considered or ignored by Ottawa.
Perhaps the solace that can be found
in the experiences of these men is
in the lessons the Korean War has
to offer current military planners
to ensure, as Watson hopes, that
“future generations of soldiers be
spared the unnecessary hardships
that were such a feature of the Ca-
nadian Infantry’s Far Eastern Tour.”
HM
* * * * *
Paul Addison and Jeremy A. Crang,
eds., The Burning Blue: A New
History of the Battle of Britain
(London: Pimlico, 2000), $35.95
paper, 292 pages, ISBN 0-7126-
6475-0.
The Burning Blue: A New His-tory of the Battle of Britain is
a collection of 18 papers originally
presented at a 1996 conference on
the Battle of Britain. The confer-
ence, organised by the Centre for
Second World War Studies at Ed-
inburgh University, was intended to
serve as the foundation for a book
reassessing established themes and
opening up new ones. The result is
a collection of high-quality essays,
which display considerable unity
although they deal with a wide va-
riety of topics.
The first two parts of the book,
written by German and British his-
torians, discuss Luftwaffe and RAF
operations both before and during
the Battle of Britain. Three papers
then follow with the Soviet, Ameri-
can, and Japanese perspectives on
the battle. Two accounts by a
Luftwaffe and a RAF pilot are in-
cluded, as are a series of letters
written by a young RAF fighter pi-
lot in 1940.
The Burning Blue is not sim-
ply a military history, and the book
includes three essays that cover the
Battle of Britain in children’s lit-
erature, pilots’ memoirs, and popu-
lar films. A paper discussing the
commemoration of the Battle in
modern Britain follows, together
with another essay describing ef-
forts being made to preserve physi-
cal sites such as airfields, opera-
tions centres, and a Chain Home
radar tower. The conclusion by Ri-
chard Overy discusses the histori-
cal significance of the battle and puts
the book into context.
This book has several strengths
that make it particularly useful. The
various authors are recognized ex-
perts in their fields, the effects of
the Battle elsewhere are recognized,
and both memory and cultural his-
tory are dealt with as well. The
Burning Blue is a coherent collec-
tion of interesting and well-written
papers that are of interest not only
to the general reader, but also to
students of the Second World War.
RH
* * * * *
David Clark, Angels Eight: Nor-
mandy Air War Diary (NP:
1stBooks Library, 2003), $32.50
paper, 382 pages, ISBN 1-4107-
2241-4.
David Clark’s brother Frankdied in his Spitfire over Nor-
mandy on 13 June 1944. This book
is in some ways a tribute to him,
and to the other Allied airmen who
fought and died in the skies over
the Normandy campaign.
It is really two books in one,
both exhaustively researched and
comprehensive in their coverage.
The first section is a detailed ac-
count of the campaign generally,
including the Allied air campaign.
The second section provides a
closer look at the RCAF’s role in
Normandy, through the actions of
127 Wing. Clark adopts a diary
style, discussing each day’s opera-
tions in turn but also pausing to
reflect on important issues, such as
the loss of Wing Commander Lloyd
Chadburn. This event is particularly
significant because Clark’s brother
was the other pilot involved in the
mid-air collision which claimed
both airmen’s lives. The accident
was a shock to the wing, but it is a
credit to the men that they were
able to regroup quickly and con-
tinue with the same level of effi-
ciency under the leadership of Wing
Commander R.A. Buckham.
The book is profusely illus-
trated, with many photos from pri-
vate collections, and includes many
appendices, with orders of battle,
victories and losses, and sorties
flown, among other things. More
useful as a reference book than a
book to read cover to cover, An-
gels Eight is nevertheless a fine
addition to the literature on tacti-
cal air power and the Normandy
campaign.
SL
* * * * *
George Godwin, Why Stay We
Here? (Victoria: privately pub-
lished [available from
www.godwinbooks.com], 2002
[1930]), $28.50 paper, 220 pages,
ISBN 0-9696774-6-4.
It has been seventy-three yearssince Why Stay We Here? has
been widely available. It was never
a huge seller, so it didn’t go through
the dozens of editions like some of
the better known books of the
genre, like All Quiet on the West-
ern Front. It didn’t find its way into
many libraries, and one rarely finds
it in an antiquarian bookshop. Nev-
ertheless, it is arguably the finest
Canadian novel of the First World
War – more substantial and less de-
rivative than Charles Yale Harrison’s
Generals Die in Bed, which usu-
ally enjoys that honour.
 Why Stay We Here? tells the
story of Stephen Craig, a British
Columbia fruit farmer, and his trial
by fire in the trenches of the West-
ern Front. It has everything one
would expect of a novel written by
someone who was all too familiar
with life at the front (Godwin, a
prewar emigrant to BC from Eng-
land, served with the 29th Battalion,
Tobin’s Tigers) – powerful descrip-
tions of conditions in the trenches
and in battle juxtaposed against the
happier times in the rear areas,
touching stories of friendships be-
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tween comrades in arms, and pas-
sages that detail the destruction of
the French landscape. But what sets
the book apart from the other Ca-
nadian contributions to the genre
is the reflective element. Through
his characters, Godwin explores
religion, morality, human weak-
ness, and a range of other themes,
and the impact on them of the most
terrible war the world had ever
seen. The book is certainly visceral
but it is much more than that, in a
way that Generals Die in Bed is
not.
But Why Stay We Here? is not
really an antiwar novel. Godwin
knew as well as anyone the horror
of war, but he also knew that there
were certain things worth defend-
ing. This gives the novel a complex-
ity often lacking in such books. It
is worth noting that when Stephen
Craig returns to British Columbia
at the conclusion, it is not with a
feeling of bitterness or disillusion-
ment, but of hope.
CA
* * * * *
Brock Millman, Pessimism and
British War Policy, 1916-1918
(London: Frank Cass [distributed
in North America by International
Specialized Book Services], 2001)
$62.50 US, 322 pages, ISBN 0-
71476-5079-X.
Pessimism and British WarPolicy is a well-researched and
written book that has much to of-
fer, not only to serious students of
the Great War but also to those with
a broader interest in strategy and
Imperial politics.
In his book, Millman rejects
traditional arguments about con-
flicts between Easterners and West-
erners and instead argues that pes-
simism, even defeatism, was a com-
mon belief and that by the end of
1916, British leaders had come to
doubt that a decisive victory could
be achieved. Peace was unthinkable
and the war was continued, not in
hopes of a victory, but rather be-
cause there was no hope for an ac-
ceptable peace. From this emerged
the “New Eastern” policy, designed
not to win the war but to avert de-
feat. British and Imperial forces
were therefore committed to cam-
paigns in an effort to secure bar-
gaining chips for the eventual peace
negotiations and to secure strate-
gic advantages for the inevitable
resumption of hostilities. Thus Brit-
ish forces became committed to an
astonishing variety of campaigns in
Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia,
Northern Russia, Siberia, and the
Caucasus, all intended to contain
either Germany or the new menace
of Bolshevism.
Rather than justifying this New
Eastern Strategy, Millman con-
cludes that it had no discernable
effect on the outcome of the war,
which in the end was won by Field-
Marshal Haig, Britain’s only opti-
mist. The strategy was wasteful,
counter-productive, and led to an-
tagonism in the Middle East, So-
viet hostility, and Indian national-
ism. Millman also points out that
the New Eastern Strategy, which
called for the imposition of minor-
ity policies on the Austro-Hungar-
ian and Ottoman Empires, was con-
tradictory because neither empire
would discuss peace terms that
would lead to their dissolution.
Rather than shortening the war
therefore, the New Eastern Strat-
egy may have prolonged it.
Pessimism and British War
Policy is a provocative, intriguing
book and a valuable addition to
World War I historiography.
RH
* * * * *
Herbert Kriloff, Proceed Orange.
Assume Command (Calgary:
Detselig Enterprises, 2002), $27.95
paper, 188 pages, ISBN 1-55059-
238-6.
Among the memoirs of naval op-erations during the Second
World War, there are very few deal-
ing with the United States Navy’s
contribution to the convoy war in
the North Atlantic. Kriloff’s account,
the second volume covering his
wartime experiences, fills that gap
admirably. After combat experience
in the Pacific theatre, he was given
command of one of the USN’s new
destroyer escorts, the USS
Scroggins. He spent two years on
convoy duties in the Atlantic, and
has some interesting reflections on
patrolling Canadian waters and
shepherding merchant and trans-
port ships to Europe and Africa.
He is also very candid about the
challenges involved in whipping his
very green and inexperienced crew
into shape and turning them into
an efficient and effective crew.
The organization of the book
is a bit problematic, the chapters
of memoir being broken up by
notes and comments on anti-sub-
marine warfare which, though in-
teresting, tend to be a bit distract-
ing and break the flow of the nar-
rative. Still, it is a worthwhile read,
especially for someone who wants
to see the Battle of the Atlantic from
a slightly different perspective.
LT
* * * * *
Jeremy Black, Warfare in the
Western World, 1882-1975
(Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2001) $19.95 US paper, 243
pages, ISBN 0-253-21509-9.
Warfare in the Western World,1882-1975 is the last of
Jeremy Black’s trilogy of studies
in war and society. A sweeping
study, it starts with Britain’s defeat
of Egypt, a leading non-western
state, and concludes with the fall
of Vietnam and the loss of Mozam-
bique, Portugal’s last major colony.
This book is not a traditional
military history with an emphasis
on operations, tactics, and technol-
ogy, but rather a broad survey that
attempts to define the context in
which the events took place.  Black
argues that military history cannot
be viewed in isolation, but must be
considered in the framework of
cultural and physical elements such
as demographics, economics, and
national political ambitions. He cau-
tions the reader against technical
determinism and linear concepts of
development, and instead questions
patterns of change and the assumed
continuity between protagonists and
allies.
Black’s book is not organized
chronologically, but rather themati-
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cally. Western expansion from Egypt
to Ethiopia, for example, is dis-
cussed in one chapter, while the
collapse of ideologically and politi-
cally bankrupt western empires
which led to the loss of colonies
from Singapore to Mozambique is
covered in another. The develop-
ment of naval and air power rate a
chapter each, but Black takes care
not to treat either in isolation, but
rather in the context of existing
military, political, and social fac-
tors. The two world wars are dealt
with, as are the periods leading up
to each conflict. Lastly, in keeping
with Black’s belief in the influence
of society on war, a chapter is de-
voted to the social and political
context of warfare.
Warfare in the Western World
offers challenging new perspectives
on the complex relationships be-
tween social forces and the conduct
of warfare, and is recommended
for use by serious students of mili-
tary history.
RH
* * * * *
Tim Ripley, The Wehrmacht: The
German Army in World War II,
1939-1945 (New York: Fitzroy
Dearborn [distributed in North
America by Routledge], 2003),
$143.00, 352 pages, ISBN 1-57958-
312-1.
The latest entry in FitzroyDearborn’s series entitled The
Great Armies begins with a very
basic question: why should the Ger-
man Army of the Second World War
be considered one of history’s great
armies? To answer that question,
Ripley offers not an exhaustive ac-
count of every action fought by the
army, but a concise overview of the
army’s campaigns and an analysis
of the factors that were behind both
its greatest victories and its biggest
defeats.
It is a well trodden path, and
Ripley’s conclusions offer few sur-
prises to the specialist: the German
Army was better than its rivals at
integrating new arms like para-
troops, assault gliders, and dive
bombers into battle-tested assault
tactics and procedures; German
officers attained a higher degree of
professionalism than their oppo-
nents, and especially excelled at
logic and clear thinking as it ap-
plied to the battlefield; and the
Army eventually became “drunk on
success” (324), and couldn’t regain
the advantage once the industrial
and human resources of its main
opponents were fully mobilized.
Ripley also never forgets that, how-
ever professional and capable it
may have been, the German Army
served an evil regime, and his dis-
cussion of the relationship between
the Army and the Nazi state, includ-
ing the Waffen-SS, is useful in this
regard.
But Ripley brings a good deal
of freshness to the subject. There
is, for example, an excellent sum-
mary of training and recruitment
policies in the German Army that
will be useful to students of any
army. So, while not everyone will
accept his assertion that the Ger-
man soldiers were “man-for-man
far superior to the soldiers that the
Allies could throw at them” (221),
few could dispute the positive im-
pact of the German reinforcement
system which, unlike the Canadian,
ensured that German soldiers
served with units of men drawn
from their own home region. The
effect of this on unit cohesion,
Ripley notes, was significant.
It is an expensive book, but it
boasts excellent maps, an extensive
range of photographs, and very high
production values. Interestingly, this
book on the German Army is dedi-
cated to the men of Bomber Com-
mand and the US Army Air Force
who laid waste to German cities and
helped bring down the regime that
the Army served.
SL
* * * * *
Laurence F. Wilmot, MC, Through
the Hitler Line: Memoirs of an
Infantry Chaplain (Waterloo, ON:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press,
2003), $34.95, 148 pages, ISBN 0-
88920-426-8.
As Laurence Wilmot demon-strates in this fascinating
memoir, there was a good deal
more to the job of a military chap-
lain than simply ministering to the
spiritual needs of the troops.
Wilmot served as an Anglican chap-
lain to the West Nova Scotia Regi-
ment in Italy from February 1944
until the end of the war. The unit’s
commanding officer, Ronnie
Waterman, was initially dubious
about Wilmot, and reacted coolly
to him in their first few meetings.
But the padre soon won over
Waterman, and became an integral
part of the unit.
There is much in the book
about Wilmot’s personal spiritual-
ity and his ministrations to the men
of the unit, but he was much more
than just a chaplain. He spent much
of his time at the front working as
a stretcher bearer, coordinating the
work of the medics and sometimes
doing the carrying himself. He also
acted as a sounding board for the
men, providing a sympathetic ear
to their concerns and doing what
he could to ease their minds about
domestic problems at home or per-
formance anxiety in battle. He was
so effective at this that Waterman
came to rely on him for periodic
reports on morale within the unit
and ways to improve it. Further-
more, he also acted as a kind of
social service officer, counselling
the men on postwar career oppor-
tunities and making sure they un-
derstood the government benefits
that would be available to them af-
ter the war.
Historians of the Italian cam-
paign will find much of interest
here, for Wilmot was in almost daily
contact with the men at the sharp
end and traversed many of the bat-
tlefields as he worked to collect the
wounded. But at root, it is a fasci-
nating human story, for even among
chaplains, he was a man of unusual
empathy and dedication.
LT
* * * * *
14
Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 8
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol12/iss4/8
15© Canadian Military History Book Review Supplement, Autumn 2003
J. Timothy Lovelace, The Artistry
and Tradition of Tennyson’s Bat-
tle Poetry (New York: Routledge,
2003), $65.00 US, 187 pages, ISBN
0-415-96763-5.
Tennyson’s most famous warpoem is “The Charge of the
Light Brigade” (“Theirs not to rea-
son why, / Theirs but to do and die.
/ Into the valley of Death / Rode the
six hundred”) but as Lovelace dem-
onstrates in this fine revised dis-
sertation, he was a far more pro-
lific battle poet than most people
realize. Some of his verses dealt
with mythic and legendary conflicts,
but many were concerned with
events of his own time, from the
civil war in Greece to the Crimean
War. From this body of work,
Lovelace concludes that Tennyson
was a gifted patriotic poet in that
he “inspired real warriors and
commemorated the exploits of his
own national military heroes” (85).
* * * * *
Gwilym Jones, MM, Living His-
tory Chronicles (Burnstown, ON:
General Store Publishing, 2002),
$29.95 paper, 229 pages, ISBN 1-
894263-50-2.
Since 1998, Branch 258 of theRoyal Canadian Legion in High-
land Creek, Ontario (greater To-
ronto) has organized a speakers
bureau, sending veterans to local
schools to relate their experiences
to a new generation of Canadians.
In this volume, Jones (author of the
1993 To the Green Fields Beyond:
A Soldier’s Story) collects the rec-
ollections of over two dozen of the
members whose experiences cover
a wide range of aspects of the Sec-
ond World War, the Korean War, and
other conflicts.
* * * * *
John J. Koneazny, Behind
Friendly Lines: Tales from World
War II (Burnstown, ON: General
Store Publishing, 2002), $24.95
paper, 156 pages, ISBN 1-894263-
48-0.
Rejected by the navy on accountof colour-blindness, Koneazny
instead joined the merchant marine
in 1943 and eventually found his
way into the Transportation Corps
of the US Army. His duties there
were many and varied, including
preparing weapons and other sup-
plies for shipment back to the
United States after the war was over.
It is an interesting look at the sup-
ply side of war, although it tends to
be a little hard to follow because
the narrative frequently jumps
around from the 1940s to the
1990s.
* * * * *
Blitz Assault Through Fire and
Water (Milton Keynes, UK: Military
Press, 2002),£16.99, 80 pages,
ISBN 0-85420-123-8.
These accounts of assaults onforts, fortifications, and de-
fended riverbanks by elite German
Army units in the campaigns in Po-
land and western Europe in 1939-
40 were compiled from contempo-
rary accounts, probably by an
American officer with the US Em-
bassy in Berlin. They are supported
by detailed maps and technical in-
formation on equipment and unit
formation, and describe what was
necessary to clear the path for Ger-
man tank formations to sweep
through Poland, the Low Countries,
and France.
* * * * *
Richard Landwehr, Estonian Vi-
kings: Estnisches SS-
Freiwilligen Bataillon Narwa
and Subsequent Units, Eastern
Front, 1943-44 (Halifax, UK: Shelf
Books [distributed in North Ameri-
can by International Specialized
Book Services]), 1999), $33.00 US
paper, 78 pages, ISBN 1-899765-09-
3.
The Estonian battalion Narwawas the first and best fighting
unit fielded by this small Baltic
nation as part of the Nazis’ crusade
against communism. Fully motor-
ized and equipped with heavy sup-
port weapons, it served in the mul-
tinational SS Wiking Division. This
photographic history covers the
unit from its attachment to the
Wiking Division in August 1943,
through its period of heaviest fight-
ing, in August of 1943.
* * * * *
Lee Sharp, The French Army,
1939-1940: Organization, Order
of Battle, Operational History,
vol. 1 (Milton Keynes, UK: Military
Press, 2002), £32.99, 140 pages,
ISBN 0-85420-316-8.
The first of a seven-volume se-ries, Sharp’s book is an essen-
tial reference work on what was
considered to be one of the most
powerful military organizations in
Europe in 1939. Subjects covered
in this volume include the French
armies in North Africa, the military
districts of France, the high com-
mand structure, the motorized and
cavalry units, and the French
Scandinavian Expeditionary Force.
* * * * *
Randolph W. Kirkland, Jr., Dark
Hours: South Carolina Soldiers,
Sailors and Citizens who were
held in Federal Prisons during
the War for Southern Independ-
ence, 1861-1865 (Charleston:
South Carolina Historical Society
[distributed in Canada by Scholarly
Book Services], 2003), $74.25, 538
pages, ISBN 0-9719784-0-9.
This is one of those prodigiousfeats of research which will be
indispensable to the specialist, but
of limited interest to the general
reader. Kirkland has combed every
conceivable source to compile a list
of 11,238 South Carolinians who
were captured during the US Civil
War; of those who made it to a per-
manent prison camp, nearly 20%
died in captivity. The nominal list-
ing takes up the bulk of the book,
but there are also very useful sta-
tistical summaries and notes on the
treatment and disposition of pris-
oners.
Briefly Noted
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